Friday, July 13, 2007
White House gives mixed progress report on Iraq benchmarks
(AP) - The White House gave a mixed progress report Thursday on 18 so-called benchmarks for political, military and economic reforms in Iraq. What follows is a look at obstacles confronting some of these U.S.-set goals. The grade in each case is from the Bush administration, and The Associated Press takes a closer look at the realities on the ground.
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GOAL: Legislation on ways to restore political, government and military positions to selected members of Saddam Hussein's Baath party.
PROGRESS: Unsatisfactory, according to the Bush administration.
REALITY CHECK: Some draft plans have been discussed among Iraqi parliament members, but there's been no clear action on any proposal.
___
GOAL: An oil law to share wealth in "an equitable manner" among Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds and other Iraqi groups.
PROGRESS: Unsatisfactory.
REALITY CHECK: The draft law is bogged down due to wide differences between Sunnis and Kurds on local control of oil fields. No firm compromise is in sight.
___
GOAL: Allowing Iraqi military and police to operate independently and with "evenhanded enforcement."
PROGRESS: Unsatisfactory.
REALITY CHECK: Many complications exist. U.S. commanders say Iraqi forces are not at full strength and training is slowed by problems including desertions and equipment shortages. U.S. estimates say Iraq's security forces could be months _ or even years _ away from operating effectively without American reinforcements. The troubles are particularly acute in the national police.
___
GOAL: Reducing the level of sectarian violence and eliminating militia control of security forces.
PROGRESS: Unsatisfactory, but with some components of progress.
REALITY CHECK: Militias still hold influence over the Shiite-led security forces. Overall violence showed some declines following the launch of a Baghdad security crackdown in February, but bloodshed is climbing again, according to figures compiled by the AP. In July, civilian deaths jumped backed up to levels of violence not seen since December, with an average of at least 75 Iraqis being killed each day.
___
GOAL: Provide three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support operations in Baghdad.
PROGRESS: Satisfactory.
REALITY CHECK: The units are in place, but not at full strength. Kurdish forces show the best capabilities so far. Others lag behind.
___
GOAL: Review the 2005 constitution and recommend amendments to meet Sunni aspirations.
PROGRESS: Satisfactory.
REALITY CHECK: The review committee has been formed and has held meetings, but asked for more time to finish work. Kurds and Shiites want very limited changes.
___
GOAL: Establishing all of the planned U.S.-Iraq joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad as a way to gain better contact with residents.
PROGRESS: Satisfactory.
REALITY CHECK: Most of the planned stations have been set up, but some have come under attack and questions remain about the effectiveness of the civilian outreach.
___
GOAL: Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.
PROGRESS: Satisfactory.
REALITY CHECK: Efforts are stalled as tensions remain very high between Sunni parties and the Shiite-led government. Feuding between Shiite parties also has increased.
___
GOAL: Laws to begin disarming militias and demanding loyalty to the central government.
PROGRESS: Too early to assess.
REALITY CHECK: Such reforms are extremely difficult to achieve and directly challenge Iraqi cultural and tribal traditions.
___
GOAL: Legislation on ways to restore political, government and military positions to selected members of Saddam Hussein's Baath party.
PROGRESS: Unsatisfactory, according to the Bush administration.
REALITY CHECK: Some draft plans have been discussed among Iraqi parliament members, but there's been no clear action on any proposal.
___
GOAL: An oil law to share wealth in "an equitable manner" among Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds and other Iraqi groups.
PROGRESS: Unsatisfactory.
REALITY CHECK: The draft law is bogged down due to wide differences between Sunnis and Kurds on local control of oil fields. No firm compromise is in sight.
___
GOAL: Allowing Iraqi military and police to operate independently and with "evenhanded enforcement."
PROGRESS: Unsatisfactory.
REALITY CHECK: Many complications exist. U.S. commanders say Iraqi forces are not at full strength and training is slowed by problems including desertions and equipment shortages. U.S. estimates say Iraq's security forces could be months _ or even years _ away from operating effectively without American reinforcements. The troubles are particularly acute in the national police.
___
GOAL: Reducing the level of sectarian violence and eliminating militia control of security forces.
PROGRESS: Unsatisfactory, but with some components of progress.
REALITY CHECK: Militias still hold influence over the Shiite-led security forces. Overall violence showed some declines following the launch of a Baghdad security crackdown in February, but bloodshed is climbing again, according to figures compiled by the AP. In July, civilian deaths jumped backed up to levels of violence not seen since December, with an average of at least 75 Iraqis being killed each day.
___
GOAL: Provide three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support operations in Baghdad.
PROGRESS: Satisfactory.
REALITY CHECK: The units are in place, but not at full strength. Kurdish forces show the best capabilities so far. Others lag behind.
___
GOAL: Review the 2005 constitution and recommend amendments to meet Sunni aspirations.
PROGRESS: Satisfactory.
REALITY CHECK: The review committee has been formed and has held meetings, but asked for more time to finish work. Kurds and Shiites want very limited changes.
___
GOAL: Establishing all of the planned U.S.-Iraq joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad as a way to gain better contact with residents.
PROGRESS: Satisfactory.
REALITY CHECK: Most of the planned stations have been set up, but some have come under attack and questions remain about the effectiveness of the civilian outreach.
___
GOAL: Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.
PROGRESS: Satisfactory.
REALITY CHECK: Efforts are stalled as tensions remain very high between Sunni parties and the Shiite-led government. Feuding between Shiite parties also has increased.
___
GOAL: Laws to begin disarming militias and demanding loyalty to the central government.
PROGRESS: Too early to assess.
REALITY CHECK: Such reforms are extremely difficult to achieve and directly challenge Iraqi cultural and tribal traditions.
Labels: benchmarks, Iraq, report, White House
Tuesday, June 26, 2007
RFE/RL report: "Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War Of Images And Ideas"
Report, Insurgency
(RFE/RL) -- The greatest strengths of the Iraqi Sunni-based insurgency's media strategy -- decentralization and flexibility -- are also its greatest weaknesses, according to a report officially released today by RFE/RL.
The book-length report, "Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War Of Images And Ideas" by RFE/RL regional analysts Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo, provides an in-depth analysis of the media efforts of Sunni insurgents, who are responsible for the majority of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq.
The popularity of online Iraqi Sunni insurgent media, the authors contend, reflects a genuine demand for their message in the Arab world.
Kimmage and Ridolfo argue that the loss of coordination and message control that results from decentralization has revealed fundamental disagreements about Iraq's present and future between nationalist and global jihadist groups in Iraq and that these disagreements are ripe for exploitation by those interested in a liberal and democratic Iraq.
The report also finds that anti-Shi'ite hate speech is an increasingly prominent part of the insurgent message. With sectarian killings on the rise in Iraq, the tenor of invective points to the possibility of even greater bloodshed. A wealth of evidence shows that hate speech paved the way for genocide in Rwanda in 1994, for example.
Iraq's Sunni insurgency has developed a sophisticated media campaign to deliver its message over the Internet through daily press releases, weekly and monthly magazines, books, video clips, full-length films, countless websites, and even television stations. Part of the target audience for insurgent media projects are mainstream Arabic-language media, which often amplify the insurgent message to a mass audience.
The popularity of online Iraqi Sunni insurgent media, the authors contend, reflects a genuine demand for their message in the Arab world. A response, no matter how lavishly funded and cleverly produced, will not eliminate this demand. The authors argue that efforts to counter insurgent media should not focus on producing better propaganda than the insurgents, or trying to eliminate the demand for the insurgent message, but rather on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the insurgent media network.
(pdf format):
The entire report
Part One Part Two Part Three Part Four Part Five
The book-length report, "Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War Of Images And Ideas" by RFE/RL regional analysts Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo, provides an in-depth analysis of the media efforts of Sunni insurgents, who are responsible for the majority of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq.
The popularity of online Iraqi Sunni insurgent media, the authors contend, reflects a genuine demand for their message in the Arab world.
Kimmage and Ridolfo argue that the loss of coordination and message control that results from decentralization has revealed fundamental disagreements about Iraq's present and future between nationalist and global jihadist groups in Iraq and that these disagreements are ripe for exploitation by those interested in a liberal and democratic Iraq.
The report also finds that anti-Shi'ite hate speech is an increasingly prominent part of the insurgent message. With sectarian killings on the rise in Iraq, the tenor of invective points to the possibility of even greater bloodshed. A wealth of evidence shows that hate speech paved the way for genocide in Rwanda in 1994, for example.
Iraq's Sunni insurgency has developed a sophisticated media campaign to deliver its message over the Internet through daily press releases, weekly and monthly magazines, books, video clips, full-length films, countless websites, and even television stations. Part of the target audience for insurgent media projects are mainstream Arabic-language media, which often amplify the insurgent message to a mass audience.
The popularity of online Iraqi Sunni insurgent media, the authors contend, reflects a genuine demand for their message in the Arab world. A response, no matter how lavishly funded and cleverly produced, will not eliminate this demand. The authors argue that efforts to counter insurgent media should not focus on producing better propaganda than the insurgents, or trying to eliminate the demand for the insurgent message, but rather on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the insurgent media network.
(pdf format):
The entire report
Part One Part Two Part Three Part Four Part Five
Labels: Daniel Kimmage, insurgency, Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War Of Images And Ideas, Kathleen Ridolfo, report, RFE/RL
Latest ICG report - Where is Iraq heading? Lessons from Basra
(International Crisis Group) - The British experience in Basra, far from being a model to be replicated in the rest of Iraq, is an example of what to avoid.
Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines the city's descent into chaos under British occupation, offering important lessons for Baghdad and the nation as a whole. Coalition forces there already implemented a security plan in many ways similar to the current "surge" in the capital and its environs. As in Baghdad, one of the putative goals was to pave the way for a takeover by Iraqi forces. Today, however, Basra is controlled by militias which are even more powerful than before.
“With renewed violence and instability, Basra illustrates the pitfalls of a transitional process that, instead of building legitimate institutions, has led to collapse of the state apparatus”, says Crisis Group Senior Analyst Peter Harling. “Fierce intra-Shiite fighting also disproves the notion of an Iraq neatly partitioned between three homogenous communities”.
Basra’s political arena is in the hands of actors engaged in bloody competition for resources, undermining what is left of governorate institutions and coercively enforcing their rule. The local population has no choice but to seek protection from one of the dominant camps. Periods of stability do not reflect greater governing authority so much as they do a momentary -- and fragile -- balance of interests or of terror between rival militias. Inevitably, cycles of brutal retaliatory violence re-emerge.
As the U.S. prosecutes its security plan in Baghdad and other parts of the country, the lessons from Basra are clear. First, the answer to Iraq’s horrific violence cannot be a military surge that aims to bolster the existing political structure and treats the dominant political parties as partners. Secondly, violence is not solely the result of al-Qaeda-type terrorism or sectarian hostility, however costly both evidently are. Thirdly, violence has become a routine means of social interaction utilised by political actors doubling as militiamen who seek to increase their share of power and resources.
The Basra experience suggests the most likely outcome in Iraq is its untidy break-up into myriad fiefdoms, superficially held together by the presence of coalition forces. If this is to be avoided, the priority should be to confront the power structure whose establishment was supported in the wake of the 2003 invasion, as well as the parties that now dominate it, by insisting on genuine political compromises and a more inclusive system of governance.
“It is high time that Washington and London acknowledge that their so-called Iraqi partners, far from building a new state, are tirelessly working to tear it down”, says Robert Malley, Crisis Group’s Middle East Program Director.
Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines the city's descent into chaos under British occupation, offering important lessons for Baghdad and the nation as a whole. Coalition forces there already implemented a security plan in many ways similar to the current "surge" in the capital and its environs. As in Baghdad, one of the putative goals was to pave the way for a takeover by Iraqi forces. Today, however, Basra is controlled by militias which are even more powerful than before.
“With renewed violence and instability, Basra illustrates the pitfalls of a transitional process that, instead of building legitimate institutions, has led to collapse of the state apparatus”, says Crisis Group Senior Analyst Peter Harling. “Fierce intra-Shiite fighting also disproves the notion of an Iraq neatly partitioned between three homogenous communities”.
Basra’s political arena is in the hands of actors engaged in bloody competition for resources, undermining what is left of governorate institutions and coercively enforcing their rule. The local population has no choice but to seek protection from one of the dominant camps. Periods of stability do not reflect greater governing authority so much as they do a momentary -- and fragile -- balance of interests or of terror between rival militias. Inevitably, cycles of brutal retaliatory violence re-emerge.
As the U.S. prosecutes its security plan in Baghdad and other parts of the country, the lessons from Basra are clear. First, the answer to Iraq’s horrific violence cannot be a military surge that aims to bolster the existing political structure and treats the dominant political parties as partners. Secondly, violence is not solely the result of al-Qaeda-type terrorism or sectarian hostility, however costly both evidently are. Thirdly, violence has become a routine means of social interaction utilised by political actors doubling as militiamen who seek to increase their share of power and resources.
The Basra experience suggests the most likely outcome in Iraq is its untidy break-up into myriad fiefdoms, superficially held together by the presence of coalition forces. If this is to be avoided, the priority should be to confront the power structure whose establishment was supported in the wake of the 2003 invasion, as well as the parties that now dominate it, by insisting on genuine political compromises and a more inclusive system of governance.
“It is high time that Washington and London acknowledge that their so-called Iraqi partners, far from building a new state, are tirelessly working to tear it down”, says Robert Malley, Crisis Group’s Middle East Program Director.
Labels: Basra, Inetrnational Crisis Group, report
