Tuesday, July 31, 2007
Iraq's Interior Ministry - "a federation of oligarchs"
Government
(Los Angeles Times) - Iraq's Ministry of Interior — the balkanized command center for the nation's police and mirror of the deadly factions that have caused the government here to grind nearly to a halt. The very language that Americans use to describe government — ministries, departments, agencies — belies the reality here of militias that kill under cover of police uniform and remain above the law.
Until recently, one or two Interior Ministry police officers were assassinated each week while arriving or leaving the building, probably by fellow officers, senior police officials say. That killing has been reduced, but Western diplomats still describe the Interior Ministry building as a "federation of oligarchs." Those who work in the building liken departments to hostile countries. Survival depends on keeping abreast of shifting factional alliances and turf.
On the second floor is Gen. Mahdi Gharrawi, a former national police commander. Last year, U.S. and Iraqi troops found 1,400 prisoners, mostly Sunnis, at a base he controlled in east Baghdad. Many showed signs of torture. The interior minister blocked an arrest warrant against the general this year, senior Iraqi officials confirmed.
The third- and fifth-floor administrative departments are the domain of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's Islamic Dawa Party, a Shiite group. The sixth, home to border enforcement and the major crimes unit, belongs to the Badr Organization militia. Its leader, Deputy Minister Ahmed Khafaji, is lauded by some Western officials as an efficient administrator and suspected by others of running secret prisons.
The seventh floor is intelligence, where the Badr Organization and armed Kurdish groups struggle for control. The ninth floor is shared by the department's inspector general and general counsel, religious Shiites. Their offices have been at the center of efforts to purge the department's remaining Sunni employees. The counsel's predecessor, a Sunni, was killed a year ago."They have some bad things on the ninth," says the colonel, a Sunni who, like other ministry officials, spoke on condition of anonymity to guard against retaliation.
The ministry's computer department is on the 10th floor. Two employees were arrested there in February on suspicion of smuggling in explosives, according to police and U.S. military officials. Some Iraqi and U.S. officials say the workers intended to store bombs there. Others say they were plotting to attack the U.S. advisors stationed directly above them on the top floor.
The factionalization of the ministry began quickly after Saddam Hussein's fall. As with most Iraqi government departments, deputy ministers were appointed to represent each of the country's main political parties. Deputies then distributed jobs among party stalwarts. The initial winners were the Kurdish Democratic Party and the two Shiite parties, Dawa and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, which sponsors the Badr Organization. The Kurdish party is one of two factions that control Iraq's northern provinces.
Sadr's Al Mahdi militia started late in the patronage game but has made significant inroads, particularly among the guard force that surrounds the ministry compound.Parties representing the Sunni minority, which controlled Iraq in Hussein's day, have been almost entirely purged from the ministry in the last two years. Three of the ministry's longest-serving Sunni generals have been killed in the last year.
Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, a Shiite leader who took office last summer, has attempted to repair the ministry's reputation. He has removed the leaders of eight of nine national police brigades and 17 of 27 police battalions, which have been accused of killings and mass kidnappings. But change has come slowly. "There is a lot of pressure, there is influence from everywhere, from everyone: political parties, religious groups, the government itself, from familial and tribal influences," said U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, who supervised the U.S. advisors to the national police until last month. "It would be very difficult for anybody to operate as a leader in this environment, and the Iraqis do," Pittard said.
No floor has posed more of a challenge than the seventh, which houses the intelligence division. In theory, the intelligence office should be key to tracking and combating the insurgents who bomb Iraq's streets and marketplaces and attack U.S. soldiers. Instead, the division has been hobbled by a power struggle between two of America's nominal allies in Iraq, the Kurds and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council. The fight came to a head earlier this year with a death threat against the Kurdish deputy minister in charge of intelligence, Hussein Ali Kamal.
The Kurdish leader, who controls the eastern wing of the floor, was battling for control of the intelligence apparatus with his deputy, a Badr militia commander who dominates the western side. Several months ago, U.S. advisors warned Kamal that his life was in danger, most probably from the Badr militia, and advised him to stay in the Green Zone, away from the ministry building in east Baghdad. He stayed out of the ministry for several weeks. The Shiite deputy, Basheer Wandi, better known as Engineer Ahmed, was appointed in the spring of 2005. Around the same time, Shiite militias began aggressive efforts to target and kill Sunnis in Baghdad, often using police cover to detain Sunnis in secret prisons and carry out assassinations.
Kamal, the Kurdish deputy minister, says he believes the ministry has started reining in Shiite militias but knows suspect figures still operate openly in the ministry, including Gen. Gharrawi on the second floor. Even the remaining Sunni members of the police force respect Bolani for trying to rein in the ministry. But they know he depends on a web of fragile political alliances and wonder whether any political figure can undo the effects of several years of recruiting hard-line militia members to the ministry. "Even if they brought the prophet Muhammad or Jesus, they couldn't control them," said a senior ministry official. "They have an agenda. They follow their parties."
Labels: Ahmed Khafaji, Badr Corps, Basheer Wandi, Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, Dawa party, Engineer Ahmed, Gen. Mahdi Gharrawi, Hussein Ali Kamal, Jawad Bolani, KDP, Mahdi Army, Ministry of Interior, SIIC
Tuesday, June 26, 2007
Purge of Biased Shias from Iraqi Police Force
Security
(AP) - More than a third of Iraq's national police battalion commanders are now Sunni after a purge of Shiites who had a sectarian bias, a U.S. general said Monday. Despite improvements, he predicted it will still be years before Iraqi forces are capable of securing the country by themselves. Speaking to Pentagon reporters from Iraq, Army Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard said he had been saddened to see the destruction in one province where the number of U.S. forces had been reduced too soon.
"We cannot be in a hurry to withdraw our coalition forces," he said, using Diyala province north of Baghdad as an example. Pittard this week ends his tour as day-to-day head of the effort to train Iraqi army soldiers, police, national police, border guards and other security workers. "The growth of the Iraqi security forces over the past couple of years has really been quite dramatic in many ways," he said by video conference. Among improvements: Iraqi officials have recruited Sunnis to the national police command, a group that a year ago was almost entirely Shia. The national police have been known for their ties to Shiite militia.
Pittard said that since October, officials had removed seven of nine brigade commanders — five because of sectarian bias. One of two division commanders is now Sunni, as are four of nine brigade commanders and 9 or 10 of the 27 battalion commanders, he said. But he warned against being "in a hurry" to hand over responsibility for Iraq security to local soldiers and police — a handover U.S. officials have said is key to bringing American forces home.
"We cannot be in a hurry to withdraw our coalition forces," he said, using Diyala province north of Baghdad as an example. Pittard this week ends his tour as day-to-day head of the effort to train Iraqi army soldiers, police, national police, border guards and other security workers. "The growth of the Iraqi security forces over the past couple of years has really been quite dramatic in many ways," he said by video conference. Among improvements: Iraqi officials have recruited Sunnis to the national police command, a group that a year ago was almost entirely Shia. The national police have been known for their ties to Shiite militia.
Pittard said that since October, officials had removed seven of nine brigade commanders — five because of sectarian bias. One of two division commanders is now Sunni, as are four of nine brigade commanders and 9 or 10 of the 27 battalion commanders, he said. But he warned against being "in a hurry" to hand over responsibility for Iraq security to local soldiers and police — a handover U.S. officials have said is key to bringing American forces home.
Labels: Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, Diyala, Iraqi Police Force
Tuesday, May 01, 2007
Al-Maliki's office accused of unfairly targeting senior Sunni officers
Security, Politics
(Los Angeles Times-Washington Post ) - A department of the Iraqi prime minister's office is playing a leading role in the arrest and removal of senior Iraqi army and national police officers, some of whom have apparently worked too aggressively to combat violent Shiite militias, according to US military officials.
Since March 1, at least 16 army and national police commanders have been fired, detained or pressured to resign; at least nine of them are Sunnis, according to US military documents shown to The Washington Post. Although some of the officers appear to have been fired for legitimate reasons, such as poor performance or corruption, several were considered to be among the better Iraqi officers in the field. The dismissals have angered US and Iraqi leaders who say the Shiite-led government is sabotaging the military to achieve sectarian goals.
"Their only crimes or offences were they were successful against" the Mahdi Army, a powerful Shiite militia, said Brigadier General Dana Pittard, commanding general of the Iraq Assistance Group, which works with Iraqi security forces. "I'm tired of seeing good Iraqi officers having to look over their shoulders when they're trying to do the right thing."
The issue strikes at a central question about the fledgling government of Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki: whether it can put sectarian differences aside to deliver justice fairly. Iraqi government officials denied that security force commanders have faced political pressure and said Al Maliki is committed to targeting all criminals equally. Sadiq Al Rikabi, a political adviser to Al Maliki, said the first two months of the Baghdad security plan show that Al Maliki "is not working on any agenda but the national agenda."
One adviser in the office, Basima Luay Hasun Al Jaidri, has enough influence to remove and intimidate senior commanders, and her work has 'stifled' many officers who are afraid of angering her, a senior US military official said. US commanders are considering installing a US liaison officer in the department to better understand its influence.
Since March 1, at least 16 army and national police commanders have been fired, detained or pressured to resign; at least nine of them are Sunnis, according to US military documents shown to The Washington Post. Although some of the officers appear to have been fired for legitimate reasons, such as poor performance or corruption, several were considered to be among the better Iraqi officers in the field. The dismissals have angered US and Iraqi leaders who say the Shiite-led government is sabotaging the military to achieve sectarian goals.
"Their only crimes or offences were they were successful against" the Mahdi Army, a powerful Shiite militia, said Brigadier General Dana Pittard, commanding general of the Iraq Assistance Group, which works with Iraqi security forces. "I'm tired of seeing good Iraqi officers having to look over their shoulders when they're trying to do the right thing."
The issue strikes at a central question about the fledgling government of Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki: whether it can put sectarian differences aside to deliver justice fairly. Iraqi government officials denied that security force commanders have faced political pressure and said Al Maliki is committed to targeting all criminals equally. Sadiq Al Rikabi, a political adviser to Al Maliki, said the first two months of the Baghdad security plan show that Al Maliki "is not working on any agenda but the national agenda."
One adviser in the office, Basima Luay Hasun Al Jaidri, has enough influence to remove and intimidate senior commanders, and her work has 'stifled' many officers who are afraid of angering her, a senior US military official said. US commanders are considering installing a US liaison officer in the department to better understand its influence.
Labels: Basima Luay Hasun Al Jaidri, Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, Iraq Assistance Group, Iraqi Army officers, Mahdi Army, Shiite militias
Fears of a failed state if the U.S. withdraws too soon
Security
(CNN) - There are about 330,000 trained Iraqi security forces, including 120,000 in the Iraqi army and 135,000 police force members, according to the U.S. Defense Department. But, according to a Defense Department report in March, "The actual number of present-for-duty soldiers is about one-half to two-thirds of the total due to scheduled leave, absence without leave and attrition."
The Iraqi army's administration has not kept up with its recruitment. Some units don't want to be deployed away from their home districts. On any day, one-quarter of the force is on vacation; soldiers get one week off in every four. Also compared with a contracted, professional army, Iraqi soldiers are hired as if it's for any job, and they are free to leave whenever they wish. Many do, officials say.
In combat, without American forces present, the Iraqi soldiers have no medical evacuation capacity and no air support. They rely on the U.S.-led coalition for equipment, training and supplies. "The sacrifice of U.S. soldiers and the families of soldiers ... is incredible," Gen. Ali Ghiran-Majeed says, speaking through a translator. "We Iraqis will never forget them. [But] we need the coalition to stay."
Polls of Iraqis this year have consistently shown an overwhelming majority want U.S. forces to leave -- but not just yet. And as much as the majority of Iraqis say they loathe the American presence, they also fear its end.
U.S. Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard says the American people are right to hold the U.S. policy accountable in Iraq, but he appeals for patience. "It takes time," he says. "A huge amount of progress has been made, but we're not there yet." He cites the Iraqi army. "In early 2005, there were two struggling IA [Iraqi army] divisions. Now there are 10 very capable IA divisions, and we're working on the 11th and 12th."
Pittard is counted a rising star in the U.S. military, a thoughtful man devoid of swagger. His experience includes a year commanding troops in Diyala province, which has recently descended into bloody chaos. He is frank in assessing the Iraqi military. "The Iraqi Security Forces cannot take the fight to the enemy without our assistance at this point," he says.
He says an American withdrawal, like many in Washington are pushing for, "would cause a huge vacuum that the enemies of Iraq would take advantage of. We cannot leave Iraq in disarray. We came here in 2003. We cannot leave this nation as a failed state," he says. A failed state is what almost everyone in Iraq predicts if the Americans go too early. It is one of the very few points of agreement here.
The Iraqi army's administration has not kept up with its recruitment. Some units don't want to be deployed away from their home districts. On any day, one-quarter of the force is on vacation; soldiers get one week off in every four. Also compared with a contracted, professional army, Iraqi soldiers are hired as if it's for any job, and they are free to leave whenever they wish. Many do, officials say.
In combat, without American forces present, the Iraqi soldiers have no medical evacuation capacity and no air support. They rely on the U.S.-led coalition for equipment, training and supplies. "The sacrifice of U.S. soldiers and the families of soldiers ... is incredible," Gen. Ali Ghiran-Majeed says, speaking through a translator. "We Iraqis will never forget them. [But] we need the coalition to stay."
Polls of Iraqis this year have consistently shown an overwhelming majority want U.S. forces to leave -- but not just yet. And as much as the majority of Iraqis say they loathe the American presence, they also fear its end.
U.S. Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard says the American people are right to hold the U.S. policy accountable in Iraq, but he appeals for patience. "It takes time," he says. "A huge amount of progress has been made, but we're not there yet." He cites the Iraqi army. "In early 2005, there were two struggling IA [Iraqi army] divisions. Now there are 10 very capable IA divisions, and we're working on the 11th and 12th."
Pittard is counted a rising star in the U.S. military, a thoughtful man devoid of swagger. His experience includes a year commanding troops in Diyala province, which has recently descended into bloody chaos. He is frank in assessing the Iraqi military. "The Iraqi Security Forces cannot take the fight to the enemy without our assistance at this point," he says.
He says an American withdrawal, like many in Washington are pushing for, "would cause a huge vacuum that the enemies of Iraq would take advantage of. We cannot leave Iraq in disarray. We came here in 2003. We cannot leave this nation as a failed state," he says. A failed state is what almost everyone in Iraq predicts if the Americans go too early. It is one of the very few points of agreement here.
Labels: Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, Gen. Ali Ghiran-Majeed, Iraqi Army, U.S. troop withdrawal
