Monday, October 08, 2007
Basra police chief steps up to militia challenge
Security
The Iraqi government, along with political forces, are following with concern the situation in Basra province, with the withdrawal of the British military continuing in the forthcoming months until a full withdrawal is implemented. General Abdul Jalil Khalaf, Basra police chief, told Gulf News: "The task is very difficult and conditions are extremely dangerous because each party believes that it represents the law, and each element thinks of himself as a state hero. The city includes tens or even hundreds of militias and I am ready for the task."
Statistics at the University of Basra indicates that there are about 250,000 individuals involved in the armed militias and around 144 militia groups.
There are the militias of the Dawa party headed by Nouri Al Maliki, the Badr Brigades headed by Hadi Al Ameri affiliated to Abdul Aziz Al Hakim, the Mahdi Army of Shiite leader Moqtada Sadr, the Hezbollah movement militia led by Hassan Sari, Hezbollah affiliated to Abdul Kareem Al Muhamadawi, the Fadhila party militias belong to Mohammad Al Yacoubi and other small resistance militias in the south as Imam Ali rebels, Hassan and Hussain rebels and Al Ridha followers.
The oil-rich city consists of 40 to 55 private militia who specialise in oil smuggling to Iran and stealing copper wires from electric grids. Abdul Hadi, an Iraqi army officer in Basra, told Gulf News: "The most dangerous militia is the police and security forces' militias because they have weapons and work in the name of the law. These are groups that consist of between 40 to 90 members who agree to implement kidnapping and blackmail operations or condone gang activities for major financial commissions."
Basra, especially Faw and Majnoon Islands, includes the richest oil fields in the region as well as bunches of palm orchards which yield the best types of dates in the world.
Fadhil Al Jamaly, an economic researcher, told Gulf News: "The issue of oil is the essence of conflict between armed militias, whether these are affiliated to political parties or smuggling gangs. I believe fighting will break out between the outlaw armed groups because of the weakness of state security forces and also the penetration of these militias in these forces, besides seizing land and dates palms is no less important than oil for the armed groups."
Recently, the dispute settlement body in Basra reported that armed militias affiliated to political parties, gangs and powerful individuals seized thousands of houses and real estate.
Statistics at the University of Basra indicates that there are about 250,000 individuals involved in the armed militias and around 144 militia groups.
There are the militias of the Dawa party headed by Nouri Al Maliki, the Badr Brigades headed by Hadi Al Ameri affiliated to Abdul Aziz Al Hakim, the Mahdi Army of Shiite leader Moqtada Sadr, the Hezbollah movement militia led by Hassan Sari, Hezbollah affiliated to Abdul Kareem Al Muhamadawi, the Fadhila party militias belong to Mohammad Al Yacoubi and other small resistance militias in the south as Imam Ali rebels, Hassan and Hussain rebels and Al Ridha followers.
The oil-rich city consists of 40 to 55 private militia who specialise in oil smuggling to Iran and stealing copper wires from electric grids. Abdul Hadi, an Iraqi army officer in Basra, told Gulf News: "The most dangerous militia is the police and security forces' militias because they have weapons and work in the name of the law. These are groups that consist of between 40 to 90 members who agree to implement kidnapping and blackmail operations or condone gang activities for major financial commissions."
Basra, especially Faw and Majnoon Islands, includes the richest oil fields in the region as well as bunches of palm orchards which yield the best types of dates in the world.
Fadhil Al Jamaly, an economic researcher, told Gulf News: "The issue of oil is the essence of conflict between armed militias, whether these are affiliated to political parties or smuggling gangs. I believe fighting will break out between the outlaw armed groups because of the weakness of state security forces and also the penetration of these militias in these forces, besides seizing land and dates palms is no less important than oil for the armed groups."
Recently, the dispute settlement body in Basra reported that armed militias affiliated to political parties, gangs and powerful individuals seized thousands of houses and real estate.
Labels: Al Ridha followers, Badr Brigade, Basra, Dawa party, Fadhila Party, General Abdul Jalil Khalaf, Hassan and Hussain rebels, Hezbollah, Imam Ali rebels, Mahdi Army, militias
Thursday, July 19, 2007
Al-Sadr reaches out to the public
Politics
(New York Times) - After months of lying low, the anti-American Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr has re-emerged with a shrewd strategy that reaches out to Iraqis on the street while distancing himself from the increasingly unpopular government. Mr. Sadr and his political allies have largely disengaged from government, contributing to the political paralysis noted in a White House report last week. That outsider status has enhanced Mr. Sadr’s appeal to Iraqis, who consider politics less and less relevant to their daily lives.
Mr. Sadr has been working tirelessly to build support at the grass-roots level, opening storefront offices across Baghdad and southern Iraq that dispense services that are not being provided by the government. In this he seems to be following the model established by Hezbollah, the radical Lebanese Shiite group, as well as Hamas in Gaza, with entwined social and military wings that serve as a parallel government.
He has also extended the reach of his militia, the Mahdi Army, one of the armed groups that the White House report acknowledged remain entrenched in Iraq. The militia has effectively taken over vast swaths of the capital and is fighting government troops in several southern provinces. Although the militia sometimes uses brutal tactics, including death squads, many vulnerable Shiites are grateful for the protection it affords.
At the same time, the Mahdi Army is not entirely under Mr. Sadr’s control, and he publicly denounces the most notorious killers fighting in his name. That frees him to extend an olive branch to Sunni Arabs and Christians, while championing the Shiite identity of his political base. On May 25, in his first public Friday Prayer in months, he explicitly forbade sectarian attacks. “It is prohibited to spill the blood of Sunnis and Iraqi Christians,” he told Shiites in a much publicized sermon. “They are our brothers, either in religion or in the homeland.”
Now that the leadership is in poor repute, Mr. Sadr has shifted once again. The six ministers in the cabinet and 30 lawmakers in Parliament allied to him have been boycotting sessions. They returned Tuesday, but it is not clear they will stay long. The mainstream political parties in Iraq realize that Mr. Sadr is growing more influential, but appear to be flummoxed over how to deal with him. They see him as unpredictable and manipulative, but too politically and militarily important to ignore.
“He’s powerful,” said Jaber Habeeb, an independent Shiite member of Parliament and political science professor at Baghdad University. “This is a fact you have to accept, even if you don’t like it.” The latest stance by the more conventional political parties is to keep him at arm’s length. The two major Shiite parties, Dawa and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, along with the two Kurdish parties, have been negotiating to form a new moderate coalition.
Mr. Sadr’s political leaders were told he was welcome to join, but the invitation came belatedly, after the other groups had all but completed their discussions. Mr. Sadr’s lieutenants announced that he had no interest in joining. Experts in Shiite politics believe that efforts to isolate Mr. Sadr are bound to fail.
“Sadr holds the political center in Iraq,” said Joost Hiltermann, the director of the International Crisis Group’s office in Amman, Jordan. “They are nationalist, they want to hold the country together and they are the only political organization that has popular support among the Shias. If you try to exclude him from any alliance, well, it’s a nutty idea, it’s unwise.”
The mainstream parties talk about Mr. Sadr carefully. Some never mention his followers or the Mahdi militia by name, but speak elliptically of “armed groups.” Others acknowledge his position but are reserved on the challenge he poses.
Mr. Sadr has been working tirelessly to build support at the grass-roots level, opening storefront offices across Baghdad and southern Iraq that dispense services that are not being provided by the government. In this he seems to be following the model established by Hezbollah, the radical Lebanese Shiite group, as well as Hamas in Gaza, with entwined social and military wings that serve as a parallel government.
He has also extended the reach of his militia, the Mahdi Army, one of the armed groups that the White House report acknowledged remain entrenched in Iraq. The militia has effectively taken over vast swaths of the capital and is fighting government troops in several southern provinces. Although the militia sometimes uses brutal tactics, including death squads, many vulnerable Shiites are grateful for the protection it affords.
At the same time, the Mahdi Army is not entirely under Mr. Sadr’s control, and he publicly denounces the most notorious killers fighting in his name. That frees him to extend an olive branch to Sunni Arabs and Christians, while championing the Shiite identity of his political base. On May 25, in his first public Friday Prayer in months, he explicitly forbade sectarian attacks. “It is prohibited to spill the blood of Sunnis and Iraqi Christians,” he told Shiites in a much publicized sermon. “They are our brothers, either in religion or in the homeland.”
Now that the leadership is in poor repute, Mr. Sadr has shifted once again. The six ministers in the cabinet and 30 lawmakers in Parliament allied to him have been boycotting sessions. They returned Tuesday, but it is not clear they will stay long. The mainstream political parties in Iraq realize that Mr. Sadr is growing more influential, but appear to be flummoxed over how to deal with him. They see him as unpredictable and manipulative, but too politically and militarily important to ignore.
“He’s powerful,” said Jaber Habeeb, an independent Shiite member of Parliament and political science professor at Baghdad University. “This is a fact you have to accept, even if you don’t like it.” The latest stance by the more conventional political parties is to keep him at arm’s length. The two major Shiite parties, Dawa and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, along with the two Kurdish parties, have been negotiating to form a new moderate coalition.
Mr. Sadr’s political leaders were told he was welcome to join, but the invitation came belatedly, after the other groups had all but completed their discussions. Mr. Sadr’s lieutenants announced that he had no interest in joining. Experts in Shiite politics believe that efforts to isolate Mr. Sadr are bound to fail.
“Sadr holds the political center in Iraq,” said Joost Hiltermann, the director of the International Crisis Group’s office in Amman, Jordan. “They are nationalist, they want to hold the country together and they are the only political organization that has popular support among the Shias. If you try to exclude him from any alliance, well, it’s a nutty idea, it’s unwise.”
The mainstream parties talk about Mr. Sadr carefully. Some never mention his followers or the Mahdi militia by name, but speak elliptically of “armed groups.” Others acknowledge his position but are reserved on the challenge he poses.
“Moktada Sadr is one of the political leaders of this country,” Adel Abdul-Mahdi, one of Iraq’s two vice presidents, said in a recent interview. “We disagree on some things, we have differences. We have to work to solve our differences.” Rahman al-Mussawi, 38, says he is proud that he still has Sunni Arab neighbors on his block, even though Sunni insurgents most likely killed his three younger brothers. A picture of them hangs in his living room.
The Sadrists exhibit a quiet confidence, and are pulling ever more supporters into their ranks. “The Sadr movement cannot be marginalized; it is the popular base,” said Sheik Salah al-Obaidi, the chief spokesman and a senior strategist for Mr. Sadr’s movement in Najaf. “We will not be affected by efforts to push us to one side because we are the people. We feel the people’s day-to-day sufferings.”
A number of working-class Shiites reflected that sentiment in conversations about the Mahdi militia and Mr. Sadr. Their relatives and neighbors work both for the Sadr offices and for the militia, blurring the line between social programs and paramilitary activity.
Mr. Sadr’s offices are accessible storefronts that dispense a little bit of everything: food, money, clothes, medicine and information. From just one office in Baghdad and one in Najaf in 2003, the Sadr operation has ballooned. It now has full-service offices in most provinces and nine in Baghdad, as well as several additional storefront centers. In some neighborhoods, the militiamen come around once a month to charge a nominal fee — about 5,000 Iraqi dinars, or $4 — for protection. In others, they control the fuel supply, and in some, where sectarian killings have gone on, they control the real estate market for empty houses.
The Mahdi militia is deeply involved in that sectarian killing. In a vicious campaign in the Amil neighborhood in western Baghdad, once a mixed working-class neighborhood of Shiites and Sunni Arabs, it has driven out many Sunnis and isolated others in a few enclaves.
Young men, said by residents to be part of the Mahdi militia, check every car coming into the Shiite section of the neighborhood. And many mornings, the bodies of several Sunni Arabs are dumped in a brick-strewn lot near the neighborhood’s entrance. Local Shiites routinely claim that the bodies are of foreign terrorists.
However, each community insists that it is the victim of the other. A sniper in the Sunni Arab area shoots at Shiites lined up to buy at a gasoline station that straddles the two communities. That, in turn, is used to justify retaliatory attacks on Sunni Arabs.
Among Shiites, the militia is viewed as their best form of protection from Sunni Arab insurgents. “This is the Mahdi Army standing in our streets,” said Rahman al-Mussawi, 38, a community leader who says he is proud that he still has Sunni Arab neighbors on his block, even though Sunni insurgents almost certainly killed his three younger brothers. They disappeared along a deadly stretch of road south of Baghdad where Shiites have been victims of Sunni extremists.
Mr. Mussawi gestured to the end of the block, where young Mahdi guards in T-shirts checked cars entering the neighborhood: “The Americans chase them away. If the Americans just would leave, then the neighborhood would be quiet.” The Mahdi Army’s darker side is rarely discussed in Shiite neighborhoods. In Amil, some people fiercely reject any suggestion that the group runs death squads. Others might admit to some problems, but dismiss them as the excesses of a few bad apples.
The Sadrists exhibit a quiet confidence, and are pulling ever more supporters into their ranks. “The Sadr movement cannot be marginalized; it is the popular base,” said Sheik Salah al-Obaidi, the chief spokesman and a senior strategist for Mr. Sadr’s movement in Najaf. “We will not be affected by efforts to push us to one side because we are the people. We feel the people’s day-to-day sufferings.”
A number of working-class Shiites reflected that sentiment in conversations about the Mahdi militia and Mr. Sadr. Their relatives and neighbors work both for the Sadr offices and for the militia, blurring the line between social programs and paramilitary activity.
Mr. Sadr’s offices are accessible storefronts that dispense a little bit of everything: food, money, clothes, medicine and information. From just one office in Baghdad and one in Najaf in 2003, the Sadr operation has ballooned. It now has full-service offices in most provinces and nine in Baghdad, as well as several additional storefront centers. In some neighborhoods, the militiamen come around once a month to charge a nominal fee — about 5,000 Iraqi dinars, or $4 — for protection. In others, they control the fuel supply, and in some, where sectarian killings have gone on, they control the real estate market for empty houses.
The Mahdi militia is deeply involved in that sectarian killing. In a vicious campaign in the Amil neighborhood in western Baghdad, once a mixed working-class neighborhood of Shiites and Sunni Arabs, it has driven out many Sunnis and isolated others in a few enclaves.
Young men, said by residents to be part of the Mahdi militia, check every car coming into the Shiite section of the neighborhood. And many mornings, the bodies of several Sunni Arabs are dumped in a brick-strewn lot near the neighborhood’s entrance. Local Shiites routinely claim that the bodies are of foreign terrorists.
However, each community insists that it is the victim of the other. A sniper in the Sunni Arab area shoots at Shiites lined up to buy at a gasoline station that straddles the two communities. That, in turn, is used to justify retaliatory attacks on Sunni Arabs.
Among Shiites, the militia is viewed as their best form of protection from Sunni Arab insurgents. “This is the Mahdi Army standing in our streets,” said Rahman al-Mussawi, 38, a community leader who says he is proud that he still has Sunni Arab neighbors on his block, even though Sunni insurgents almost certainly killed his three younger brothers. They disappeared along a deadly stretch of road south of Baghdad where Shiites have been victims of Sunni extremists.
Mr. Mussawi gestured to the end of the block, where young Mahdi guards in T-shirts checked cars entering the neighborhood: “The Americans chase them away. If the Americans just would leave, then the neighborhood would be quiet.” The Mahdi Army’s darker side is rarely discussed in Shiite neighborhoods. In Amil, some people fiercely reject any suggestion that the group runs death squads. Others might admit to some problems, but dismiss them as the excesses of a few bad apples.
Labels: Adel Abdul Mahdi, Amil, Dawa party, Hezbollah, Mahdi Army, Moqtada Al-Sadr, Sheik Salah al-Obaidi, SIIC, Sunni insurgents
Wednesday, July 04, 2007
There Is Assistance To Lebanese Militias Entering Basrah
Al Watan (Saudi Arabian Newspaper): (Crime) [Ä Dar Al Salam Newspaper] (3 JUL)
High-level sources in Basrah have confirmed: pamphlets have been distributed which say that Hezbollah’s leaders are coming to Iraq in order to supervise operations there. Al Watan Newspaper said, “An insurgent group is assisting Hezbollah members’ entry into Basrah.” The situation in Basrah has greatly deteriorated; the displacements of Sunni families are continuous. Everyday 17 (Sunni) families are displaced; they go to either Mosul or Salah Ad Din.
Sources confirmed, “Security forces and Occupation forces (in Basrah) have established many procedures in order to prevent insurgent attacks. Basrah’s Police Chief – Brigadier Ali Hamadi Al Musawi was (recently) dismissed and he was replaced by Brigadier Abd Al Jalil Khalaf.”
High-level sources in Basrah have confirmed: pamphlets have been distributed which say that Hezbollah’s leaders are coming to Iraq in order to supervise operations there. Al Watan Newspaper said, “An insurgent group is assisting Hezbollah members’ entry into Basrah.” The situation in Basrah has greatly deteriorated; the displacements of Sunni families are continuous. Everyday 17 (Sunni) families are displaced; they go to either Mosul or Salah Ad Din.
Sources confirmed, “Security forces and Occupation forces (in Basrah) have established many procedures in order to prevent insurgent attacks. Basrah’s Police Chief – Brigadier Ali Hamadi Al Musawi was (recently) dismissed and he was replaced by Brigadier Abd Al Jalil Khalaf.”
Monday, July 02, 2007
U.S. accuses Iran of masterminding attacks on coalition
Security
(Gulf News) - The US military in Iraq has accused Iran of masterminding attacks aimed at coalition troops in Iraq and for arming and training Shiite militants. Military spokesman Brigadier-General Kevin Bergner said that the information came from a top Hezbollah fighter who was recently captured in Iraq.
Bergner said that senior Iranian leaders know about the operations of Iran’s Qods Force in Iraq. "We also understand that senior Iraqi leaders have expressed their concerns to the Iranian government about the activities," he said. Bergner said the United States had discovered three small camps near Tehran where Iraqi militants were trained by Qods Force and Hezbollah operatives.
He said that the Qods Force was also involved in an attack in Kerbala in January when gunmen, disguised as Americans, entered a government compound and killed a US soldier and abducted four others whom they later killed. He added that the military has detained a Hezbollah veteran, Ali Mussa Daqduq, who was in Iraq to organise secret cells to mirror Hezbollah's structure in Lebanon.
Iran denies involvement in the violence in Iraq and blames the US-led invasion in 2003 for the bloodshed. Iran's Defence Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar dismissed the US claim as a "sheer lie". Iran does not officially acknowledge the existence of the Qods Force. Military experts say it is a wing of Iran's Revolutionary Guards.
Bergner said that senior Iranian leaders know about the operations of Iran’s Qods Force in Iraq. "We also understand that senior Iraqi leaders have expressed their concerns to the Iranian government about the activities," he said. Bergner said the United States had discovered three small camps near Tehran where Iraqi militants were trained by Qods Force and Hezbollah operatives.
He said that the Qods Force was also involved in an attack in Kerbala in January when gunmen, disguised as Americans, entered a government compound and killed a US soldier and abducted four others whom they later killed. He added that the military has detained a Hezbollah veteran, Ali Mussa Daqduq, who was in Iraq to organise secret cells to mirror Hezbollah's structure in Lebanon.
Iran denies involvement in the violence in Iraq and blames the US-led invasion in 2003 for the bloodshed. Iran's Defence Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar dismissed the US claim as a "sheer lie". Iran does not officially acknowledge the existence of the Qods Force. Military experts say it is a wing of Iran's Revolutionary Guards.
Labels: Ali Mussa Daqduq, Brigadier-General Kevin Bergner, Hezbollah, Iran, Kerbala, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, Quds Force, Shia militias, U.S. military
Tuesday, June 05, 2007
Al Sadr Threatens Armed Uprising And Accuses Americans Of Attempting To Assassinate Him
Politics, Security
(Azzaman Newspaper) - 4 JUN - Muqtada Al Sadr refuses to open a direct dialogue with the American forces and accused the US of attempting to assassinate him. During an interview with the Independent Newspaper on Sunday, Sadr said, “The Americans tried to kill me but they failed and I am sure that they still want to eliminate me. I am a free Muslim Iraqi and I want to help the Iraqi people and for this reason the Americans hate me."
"The Americans want me to have a direct dialogue with them but there is nothing to negotiate about because the Americans are occupiers and thieves, and they should have a withdrawal schedule to leave this country. We need to know when they will do this. We are fighting an enemy stronger than us but we are on the right side even if this means that we will die because Islam encourages us to die with dignity instead of in shame.”
Al Sadr warned, “There will be a new armed uprising” in response to the Iraqi / British / American operations against the Sadr Movement and Mahdi Army. He said, “The occupiers keep attempting to provoke us but I have issued orders to start an armed resistance. We are patient and wise but we will fight the occupation and the killing. I am confirming that my movement will be like Hezbollah in Lebanon and I believe that Hezbollah and the Mahdi Army are two faces on one coin fighting on one front against the devil.”
About the recent clashes between Mahdi Army and the Badr organization, Muqtada said, “It was a misunderstanding, we have had discussions and communicated with the other side to prevent any more clashes.” About Iran, Muqtada confirmed he rejects any Iranian interference in Iraqi issues and he is against the Iranian / American negotiations about Iraq. Also, he confirmed that Iraqi issues will be solved by Iraqis.”
About the recent clashes between Mahdi Army and the Badr organization, Muqtada said, “It was a misunderstanding, we have had discussions and communicated with the other side to prevent any more clashes.” About Iran, Muqtada confirmed he rejects any Iranian interference in Iraqi issues and he is against the Iranian / American negotiations about Iraq. Also, he confirmed that Iraqi issues will be solved by Iraqis.”
Labels: assassination, Hezbollah, Mahdi Army, Moqtada Al-Sadr, U.S. forces, uprising
Saturday, March 17, 2007
Iraqi security sources - Mahdi Army members continue to train in Iran
Security
(Al Sharqiyah TV) - Iraqi security sources said that hundreds of Al-Mahdi Army members continue to receive training in the Kermanshah area in western Iran with the participation of a group of Al-Mahdi Army commanders who left Iraq for Iran six weeks ago. The sources said that the Iranian Revolution Guards Intelligence Unit and Al-Quds Operations Command asked Al-Mahdi Army to establish a command-in-waiting that would include new elements that are not publicly known, while maintaining the central command of Al-Mahdi Army militia.
The command-in-waiting will include young elements and other elements that are not wanted by Iraqi and US forces. The sources have mentioned the names of some commanders who have great influence within Al-Mahdi Army. The sources also mentioned the names of the publicly-known personalities in the Sadr Trend who are active in Iraq. Government sources repeatedly declined to give official information on the movement of Al-Mahdi Army in Iraq and Iran, thus making it difficult to verify the information coming from government and non-government sources at the same time.
The Iraqi government had in the past received a report on a training operation held in two Lebanese areas; namely, in Hirmil and Al-Nabi Shit, but Hezbollah denied any link to such training operations. The secret report presented to the Iraqi government by an Iraqi security agency said that the rumours about the training of Al-Mahdi Army in Lebanon led to discharging Hezbollah official Nawwaf al-Musawi, who was replaced by Hasan al-Rahal to coordinate the training operations in Lebanon.
Labels: Hezbollah, Iran, Kermanshah, Mahdi Army, Quds Force
Tuesday, February 27, 2007
Iran training Iraqis in Lebanon - U.S. intelligence
Security
(Reuters) Iran is training Iraqi Shi'ites to use armor-piercing munitions inside Iran and at camps in Lebanon run by the Shi'ite militant group Hezbollah, the top U.S. intelligence official said on Tuesday. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, newly installed U.S. intelligence chief Mike McConnell said it was "probable" that Iranian leaders including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei were aware that weapons known as explosively formed penetrators, or EFPs, had been supplied to Iraqi Shi'ites.
The Pentagon blames EFPs for the deaths of 170 U.S. troops since 2004. But McConnell, in his first congressional testimony as the U.S. director of national intelligence, stopped short of saying Iran was directing the EFP attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq. "We know there are Iranian weapons manufactured in Iran. We know that Quds Forces (of Iran's Revolutionary Guards) are bringing them (into Iraq)," McConnell said at a panel hearing on world threats facing the United States.
"Is there a direct link from Quds Forces delivering weapons, to the most senior leadership in Iran?" he said. "I would phrase it as 'probable' but, again, no direct link ... I am comfortable saying it's probable." McConnell took over the intelligence chief's job a week ago to replace John Negroponte, who is now deputy secretary of state.
"Is there a direct link from Quds Forces delivering weapons, to the most senior leadership in Iran?" he said. "I would phrase it as 'probable' but, again, no direct link ... I am comfortable saying it's probable." McConnell took over the intelligence chief's job a week ago to replace John Negroponte, who is now deputy secretary of state.
Labels: Hezbollah, Iran, Lebanon, Michael McConnell, training
